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Do Red and Blue Make Green? 
An Analysis of the League of Conservation 
Voters Congressional Scorecards 
Patrick Fisher & Michael Taylor 
Seton Hall University 
Vote scores, given annually to the members of Congress 
by the League of Conservation Voters ( LCV) , measurP 
the degree to which legislators support environmental 
policies. Higher LCV vote scores represent a relatively 
pro -e nvironmental stance. We find that (i) Democratic 
representatives are seen by the LCV as far better advo-
ca tes of the environment than Republican repr ese nta-
tives , (ii) the LCV vote score of representatives , 
regardless of party affiliation, improved as the support 
for Democratic presidential candidates in their con-
stituency increased, (iii) the LCV vote score of repre-
sentatives increased with the median per capita in co me 
of their c onstituency, and (iv) regional differenc es are 
found in LCV vote scores, with representatives from the 
Northeast having higher LCV scores and representa-
tives from the South having lower LCV scores. Finally , 
these variables have consistently become more ex-
planatory in determining LCV vote scores over time . 
Environmental policy describes a broad set of public poli-cies with goals that range from the protection of human health and safety from air and water pollution to the pres-
ervation of culturally important natural landmarks. The responsi-
bility for and authority of environmental policy is most com-
monly shared among federal, state, and local governments. The 
majority of federal statutes considered to be the foundation of 
United States environmental policy were first enacted in the 
1970s. Prior to this time, the issues associated with the natural 
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environment were considered to be the exclusive domain of state 
and local governments. A growing understanding of the impact 
of pollution and environmental quality on human health, com-
bined with the tendency of these impacts to affect individuals 
across state borders led Congress to take a more critical role in 
shaping a comprehensive and centralized body of environmental 
policy through legislative and budgetary control. 
Vote scores, annually given to members of Congress by the 
League of Conservation Voters (LCV), measure the degree to 
which legislators support environmental policy. Higher LCV 
scores reflect a greater pro-environmental commitment. We ex-
amine how various legislator and constituency characteristics 
(party affiliation, presidential candidate support, per capita in-
come, and region) affect LCV vote scores in the House of Repre-
sentatives. 
Interest Group Vote Ratings and the LCV Scorecard 
In order to influence the political process, interest groups 
publish ratings of members of Congress. A problematic aspect of 
interest groups is that they may have a polarizing effect on legis-
lators. The leaders of interest groups tend to have more ideologi-
cally extreme opinions than the mass public (Kirkpatrick, 1976). 
Attempts by legislators to take moderate positions may invoke 
criticism from interest groups at both ends of the ideological 
spectrum. The influence of interest groups will tend to encourage 
legislators to move away from moderate positions (Poole and 
Rosenthal, 1997). 
Interest groups that issue vote ratings can focus on relatively 
narrowly defined issues, such as environmental policy (e.g., 
League of Conservation Voters) or gun rights (e.g., National Ri-
fle Association). They can also encompass a broad spectrum of 
public policy issues (e.g., Americans for Democratic Action). 
Labor unions (e.g., United Auto Workers), business and industry 
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associations (e.g., Chamber of Commerce), and farm organiza-
tions (e.g., National Farmers Union) all rate members of Con-
gress according to votes that are considered important to them 
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). 
The LCV scores are an index of environmental support con-
structed from a subset of the roll call votes of Congressional 
members. Each year the LCV chooses the particular bills that it 
views as most significant in terms of environmental protection. 
Vote scores reflect the frequency with which the roll call votes of 
Congressional members correspond to the pro-environment posi-
tion endorsed by the LCV. Scores range from 0 to 100, where a 
score of zero indicates the member of Congress voted in opposi-
tion to all of the LCV endorsed positions, and a score of I 00 in-
dicates full support of LCV positions. 
Before moving on to our analysis of the LCV vote scores, it is 
important to note that interest group ratings should not be viewed 
as an irreproachable indicator of a representative's intentions. A 
basic weakness of using interest group rating scores is that they 
are based on a relatively small number of roll calls (Kiewiet and 
McCubbins, 1991). Thus, individual votes can be given more 
weight as a determinant of overall legislative behavior than is 
appropriate. Also, the choice of the roll call votes selected for 
constructing the score can lead to legislators being portrayed as 
more extreme than is actually the case (Snyder, 1992). Further-
more, many important decisions that legislators make, such as 
votes during committee sessions, are not calculated into interest 
group vote ratings. For all of these reasons, LCV vote scores 
should not be used as a cardinal measure of legislator behavior. 
However, they can be used effectively as an ordinal measure of 
environmental support relative to other legislators. 
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Potential Influences on LCV Vote Score 
What accounts for the differences among members of Con-
gress for support of pro-environmental legislation? What are the 
characteristics of legislators who are more likely to support leg-
islation conducive toward protecting the environment, as meas-
ured by the League of Conservation Voters? 
The role of ideology in explaining the voting behavior of 
members of Congress has been the focus of a great deal of re-
search (Peltzman, 1984; Kalt and Zupan, 1984; 1990; Poole and 
Rosenthal, 1991; 1997; Jackson and Kingdon, 1992; Bender and 
Lott, 1996; Heckman and Snyder, 1997; Nelson, 2002). Ideology 
has been conceptualized as both a useful signal of future voting 
patterns, and as a summary of the personal beliefs and prefer-
ences of the representative. The former conception conceives 
ideology as a means of reducing electorate uncertainty regarding 
a representative's stance on future issues. The latter conception 
models ideology as a potential source of conflict with the pursuit 
of constituency preferences . 
While these two conceptions of ideology are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, empirically distinguishing between them is 
difficult, and this complicates the measurement of ideology in 
practice (Nelson, 2002). Heckman and Snyder ( 1997), utilizing a 
data-intensive analysis of roll call votes finds that ideology, in 
general, is determined predominately by party affiliation and 
regional loyalty of the representative . In terms of environmental 
voting, Nelson (2002) agreed that "while pure ideology plays a 
role in Senate voting on the environment, a sizeable portion is 
explained by party and regional loyalty." 
Constituency interests undeniably play an important role in 
congressional decision-making. Since members of Congress 
would like to be reelected, constituency pressures impose mean-
ingful constraints on voting behavior (Fisher, 2005; Fiorina, 
1996; Kingdon, 1989; Fenno, 1978). Representatives who desire 
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to win reelection can be expected to act in concurrence with the 
preferences of their constituents (Downs, 1957). Members of 
Congress will thus be attentive to the people that they are elected 
to represent. Environmental policy, like all public policy, will 
impart unequal benefits and costs across citizens in different 
communities. Therefore, the demographics of a Congressional 
representative's constituency can play an important role in how 
they vote on particular issues. Heterogeneity of electorates has 
been found to be an important factor in determining roll call 
votes (Bailey and Brady, 1998). Thus, the nature of congres-
sional representation may encourage members of Congress to 
have parochial interests when it comes to environmental legisla-
tion. Potential influences on the LCV vote scores include parti-
sanship, presidential vote in congressional district, constituency 
per capita income, and region. 
This study does not attempt to measure ideology, but instead 
focuses on the direct effects of constituency variables on the en-
vironmental voting patterns of members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives as measured by relative LCV scores. However, 
we anticipate that our results will be similar to those found by 
Nelson (2002) for the U.S. Senate. In particular, we expect to 
find that party affiliation and regional loyalty explain the major-
ity of the variation of voting patterns on environmental issues 
among members of the U.S. House from 1993 - 2004 . 
Partisanship 
Officially, the LCV is a nonpartisan entity, but it is possible 
that there may be partisan patterns as to which legislators are 
rated highly by the organization. When an interest group such as 
the LCV takes a position on an issue, it can be interpreted as a 
liberal/conservative issue (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Members 
of Congress tend to have a bias toward certain groups and inter-
ests, which is in tum determined to some degree by their party 
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affiliation (Fisher, 2005; Fenno, 1978; Clausen, 1973). Candi-
dates, therefore, respond to different portions of their constituen-
cies (Fenno, 1978; Fiorina, 1974). Partisanship, however, is not 
an infallible predictor. Roll calls often split one or both of the 
parties. These splits are due at least in part to the fact that legisla-
tors have parochial interests (Fisher, 2005). Given the nature of a 
member's support, it can be to the benefit of individual members 
of Congress to go out of their way to protect the interests and 
preferences of his or her partisan electoral coalition. 
A strong partisan relationship is increasingly found to influ-
ence the direction of congressional roll call votes across the pol-
icy spectrum. This can be attributed to the ideological 
polarization of the major parties since the mid- l 970s (Poole and 
Rosenthal, 1997). However, even though partisan elites have be-
come more polarized on issues such as the environment, mass 
partisans have not necessarily followed suit (Lindaman and 
Haider-Markel, 2002). Despite evidence of substantial party di-
vergence concerning support of environmental legislation among 
Congressional representatives (Shipan and Lowry, 2001), recent 
opinion polls reveal that the difference among partisan voters 
may not be as great. For example, 81 % of registered voters sup-
ported either stronger environmental regulations or stricter en-
forcement of existing environmental laws, with 87% of 
Democrats, 86% of Independents, and 70% of Republicans hold-
ing this belief (Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Researchffarrance 
Group Telephone Survey March 13-19, 2002). 
The early history of Congressional environmental policy was 
marked by strong support from both Republicans and Democ-
rats. Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s the cornerstones 
of environmental policy such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Wa-
ter Act, and the Endangered Species Act, were enacted with 
strong bi-partisan support in Congress (Kraft, 1995; Karnie-
niecki, 1995). However, since the erosion of bi-partisan support 
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in the early 1990s, Congress has struggled to find consensus to 
enact new legislation and to reauthorize or amend existing stat-
utes (Kraft, 2000). 
Comparing the mean Democratic and Republican LCV scores 
in the House from the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) to the 1081h 
Congress (2003-04) displays the large partisan split that has de-
veloped on environmental issues in recent years (see Table I). 
Democratic representatives had an average LCV vote score rang-
ing from 68-81 while Republican representatives had an average 
LCV vote score ranging froml 2-24. The partisan differences are 
large for every Congress from the 103rd - 108th• And, if anything, 
the partisan polarization on environmental issues has become 
even more significant with time: average Democratic LCV vote 
scores went up from 69 during the 103rd Congress to 83 in the 
I ogth Congress while average Republican LCV vote scores 
trended in the opposite dfrection: from nearly 24 in 103rd Con-
gress down to 13 during the 1081h Congress. 
Table 1 
Mean League of Conservation V.lters Congressional Vote Scores by Party 
House of Representatives 
/0 3"1 Congress ( /993 -94) 
104'' Congress ( /995-96) 
!OS'' Congress ( 1997-98) 
106'' Congress (1999-2000) 
101 " Congress (2001-02) 
I 08'' Congress (2003-04) 
***p < .001: **p < .01: *p < .05 
Democrats Republicans 
69.17 23.97 
74.20 20.68 
70.63 25.18 
76.73 17.71 
79.60 16.82 
83.33 13.00 
Pres idential Vote in District 
T-Ratio 
22.579*** 
24.056*** 
19.578*** 
29.070*** 
32.360*** 
37.282*** 
As the leader of his party the president represents a direct link 
to citizen and party preferences and policies and will seek to 
promote these preferences in Congress. As chief diplomat (i.e., 
defining national interests relative to other countries and the 
\'OL. 34 2006 
44 FISHER & TAYLOR 
world) and chief executive (i.e., oversight of staff and the com-
plex activities of the federal bureaucracy responsible for the ma-
jority of domestic policy) the president can exert a great deal of 
influence over environmental policy (Soden , I 999). Since the 
president unquestionably affects congressional environmental 
decisions, the president 's popularity in one's district may influ-
ence the direction of a legislator 's vote on environmental legisla-
tion . 
To appraise constituency support for the president, our ex-
amination of the LCV vote scores will utilize the percentage of 
the vote each member 's district gave to the Democratic nominee 
for president in the previous presidential election for each Con-
gress that we study. Presidential vote share in the district, there-
fore, will be used as a rough surrogate for constituency ideology 
on environmental issues . It would be expected, for example, that 
those districts that gave Democratic presidential nominees a 
higher percentage of the vote would ~ore likely elect representa-
tives who would support Democratic environmental actions. 
Constituency Per Capita Income 
Income can play a large role in determining whether an indi-
vidual supports environmental policy. The environmental justice 
literature has confirmed that the citizens of poor and minority 
communities are disproportionately exposed to environmental 
hazards (Bullard, 1990; Been , 1993). This fact would make one 
believe that the poorest households would be the most supportive 
of environmental policy. However, the poorest households may 
also have the most to lose in supporting environmental protec-
tion policies. Budgetary spending allocated to environmental 
policy competes for the same federal dollars that assist the poor 
through social spending programs. The increased disposable in-
come of wealthier households makes them more likely to support 
additional spending on environmental protection . However, they 
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are more capable of purchasing improvements on their own (i.e., 
country club memberships, changing residence), and are less 
likely to feel the same urgency for increased environmental pro-
tection (Kahn, 2002). In addition, wealthier households may pay 
a disproportionate amount of the tax revenue for improvements 
that accrue primarily in other communities. 
While there are conflicting conjectures regarding the effect of 
changes in income at the household level on support for envi-
ronmental policy, previous studies have shown that increases in 
the average income within a district increases district-wide sup-
port for environmental policy. Elliot, Regens, and Seldon (1995) 
show an increase in national per-capita GNP have been an im-
portant factor in increasing public support for environmental 
regulation. A comparison of House constituencies below and 
above the national mean per capita income attains an interesting 
and distinct result (see Table 2). 
Table2 
Mean League of Conservation Voters Congressional Vote Scores 
by Constituency Per Capita Income 
House of Representatives . 
/03'J Congress ( 1993-94) 
104'• Congress ( 1995-96) 
105'• Congress ( 1997-98) 
106'• Congress (1999-2000) 
I 01• Congress (200 I -02) 
108• Congress (2003-04) 
***p < .001: **p < .01; *p < .05 
Mean LCV Score Mean LCV Score 
Constituency wi1h 
Below Average 
Per Capita Income 
48.58 
41.26 
39.12 
40 .65 
40.41 
45.44 
Constituency with 
Above Average 
Per Capita Income 
53.16 
48.83 
55.31 
52.93 
54.54 
47.61 
T-Ratio 
- 1.583 
-2.246* 
-5.241*** 
-3.570••· 
-4.009*** 
-.557 
Representatives representing constituencies with per capita 
income above the national mean have higher LCV vote scores 
than representatives representing constituencies below the na-
tional mean. This difference was statistically significant for each 
\'OL. 34 2006 
46 FISHER & TAYLOR 
Congress from the 104th to the I 071\ This suggests that members 
of Congress from relatively wealthier constituencies tend to be 
more supportive of environmental legislation endorsed by the 
LCV, corresponding with the research findings that these con-
stituencies should favor greater environmental protection. 
Region 
Another potential influence on congressional support for en-
vironmental legislation is the region of the country that a mem-
ber of Congress represents. Significant public policy variations 
among the states have been found to vary along cultural and re-
gional lines (Elazar, 1984). Though research on the relationships 
between region and policies has produced mixed results (Kin-
caid, 1982), Erikson, Wright, and Mel ver (1993) find that state 
politics vary along regional lines . One explanation is based on 
the history of westward migration and its resultant distribution 
pattern of various cultural groups across the United States 
(Elazar, 1984). 
Of particular importance are the Northeast and the South. 
These are the two regions of the country that have distinct policy 
preferences from the nation as a whole. For example, in a multi-
variate analysis of state usage of the death penalty, Nice (1992) 
finds that the addition of a dummy variable for the South affects 
the findings for the execution rates for the states, indicating that 
region is an influence on state's implementation of the death 
penalty. Ideologically, the states of the Northeast are signifi-
cantly more liberal than the United States as a whole, while 
southern states are substantially more conservative (Erikson, 
Wright, and Mciver, 1993). These ideological leanings can be 
seen in how the Northeast and South vote as well: in the 2004 
presidential election John Kerry won every state in the Northeast 
with the exception of West Virginia and George W. Bush won 
every state in the South. At the same time, northeastern states 
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(with the exception of West Virginia) tend to be among the 
wealthiest states in the country while the South, on a per capita 
income basis, is the poorest region of the country . Thus, the rela-
tionship between region and environmental policy may be in-
formative because it combines some of the attributes of 
partisanship and wealth. 
80 
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Figure 1 
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Congressional Vote Scores by Region 
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Regions are defined as followed : 
East : CT, DE, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY . PA, RI, WY, VT 
South : AL, AR , FL, GA, KY , LA, MS, NC, OK , SC, TN , TX , VA 
Midwest : IL , IN, IA , KS, Ml , MN , MO, NB , ND , OH, SD, WI 
West : AK , AZ, CA, CO, HI , ID, MT, NV , NM , OR, UT, WA, WY 
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Comparing the LCV vote scores of members of Congress by 
region reveals the same pattern. A one way ANOVA by region 
suggests important differences in the mean LCV scores of con-
gressional representatives (see Figure ]). In each Congress from 
the 103rd to IOst\ the mean LCV scores for representatives from 
the Northeast and South regions were significantly different than 
those of the West and Midwest, which did not significantly differ 
from one another or the national mean LCV scores. Members of 
Congress from the Northeast (ranging from 64-70) had substan-
tially higher mean LCV scores, and southern representatives had 
substantially lower LCV vote scores (ranging from 28-41). The 
mean LCV vote scores of Congress members from the West 
(ranging from 43-53) and Midwest (ranging from 41-51), are 
representative of the national average (ranging from 46-51 ). This 
suggests that Northeastern representatives tend to be the most 
supportive of environmental protection legislation and Southern 
representatives the least supportive, with Western and Midwest-
ern representatives in between the extremes of the Northeast and 
South. 
Analysis and Results 
Ordinary Least Squares models were utilized for the 103rd to 
}Ogth Congresses (1993-2004) in the House of Representatives to 
determine the relative importance of constituency characteristics 
on voting behavior of representatives. All of the independent 
variables tested were statistically significant at p<.001 for every 
Congress (Table 3). The dependent variable of legislators' LCV 
vote scores were regressed on the independent variables of party 
affiliation, constituency presidential choice, constituency per 
capita income, and region. The qualitative variables of party af-
filiation, constituency presidential choice, and region were in-
cluded in the regression as dummy variables. The Republican 
Party was the omitted variable for both party affiliation and con-
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stituency presidential choice . For region the omitted variable was 
the combination of the West and Midwe st region. As shown pre-
viously, the one-way ANOVA analysi s found no statisticall y sig-
nificant difference between both of these regions and the overall 
mean of all region s. The coefficients are interpreted as the differ-
ence between the dummy variables and the omitted variable. For 
example, the coefficient on the Northea st region is interpreted as 
the effect on LCV score relative to being from the West or Mid-
west region . 
The regression results indicate that Democratic legislators are 
more likely to support pro-environmental legislation than 
Table3 
lntluences on League of Conservation Voters Congressional Vote Scores 
House of Representative s 
Variable 
Constant 
Democra tic Party 
Affili ation 
Democratic Presiden-
tial Vote 
Per Capita Income 
Northeas t 
South 
R-squared 
Standard Error of 
Estimate 
F 
N 
League of Conservation Voters 
Congressional Vote Scores 
b 
(t value/ 
Congresses 
103"' (93-94) I 04"' (95-96) 
-2 1.979 -35. 128 
(-4.846)*** (-6 .896)*** 
40.766 42 .860 
(2 1.169)*** ( 19.400)*** 
.6 12 .8 10 
(7.972)••· (9.034)••· 
1.559 1.722 
(7.885)*** (7.9 14)*** 
7.404 11.120 
(3.549)*** (4.842)*** 
-7.858 -7.343 
(-4.22 1)*** (-3.575)*** 
.709 .740 
16.388 18.072 
208 .589*** 243 .966*** 
533 532 
l0 5"' (97-98) 
-37.576 
(-6. 729)*** 
32 . 125 
( 14 .129)*** 
.846 
(9 .145)*** 
1.901 
(8.520)*** 
7.902 
(3.253)*** 
-8.717 
(-4.077)*** 
.684 
18.747 
185.259*** 
533 
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Table 3, cont'd 
Congresses 
1 06th (99-00) 107th (0 1-02) 108th (03-04) 
Variable 
Constant -36.23 1 -22.576 -35.095 
( -7 .358)*** (-5.428)*** (-6.807)*** 
Democra tic Party 45 .925 50.849 57 .693 
Affiliation (22.7 12)*** (26.253)*** (26.775)*** 
Democratic Presiden- .78 1 .579 .700 
tial Vote (9.477)*** (8.027)*** (8.593)*** 
Per Capi ta Income 1.5 10 1.207 .000 
(7.778)*** (6.599)*** (6.035)*** 
Northeas t 7 .552 8.590 6.945 
(3.549)*** (34.27 1 )*** (3.355)*** 
South -8.042 -9.863 -4.902 
(-4.306)*** (-5.527)*** (-2.628)** 
R-squared .798 .828 .84 1 
Standard Error of 16.408 15.592 16.165 
Estimate 
F 338.520*** 4 11.069*** 45 1.504*** 
N 532 533 533 
***p < .00 1; **p < .0 1; *p < .05 
Republican legislators. This is consistent with a general trend in 
party polarization in the House of Representative s over the past 
three decade s (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Congre ss has found 
it difficult to reach agreements on environment al policy because 
of the sharp ideological divisions between the parties. The parti-
san nature of environmental policy in recent years may be to 
some degree the result of the representational nature of Con-
gress. Congre ssional districts represented by Democratic mem-
bers of Congress tend to be significantly different 
demographically and politically than those districts represented 
by Republican s (Fisher, 2005; Clausen, 1973). This dynamic has 
the potential to dramatically influence the environmental policies 
that representative s will support because in the process of repre-
senting the views of their constituent s, members of Congress are 
moving toward very different legislative priorities . Members of 
T I IEJOURNAL or P O LI T ICAL SC IENc r,: 
DO RED AND BLUE MAKE GREEN? 51 
Congress, therefore, may be simply responding to different por-
tions of their constituencies (Fiorina, 1974). The general trend in 
party polarization may also be exacerbated in terms of environ-
mental policy by the realization that the "pollution control prob-
lem" is much more complex and costly than initially anticipated 
in the 1970s (Kraft, 2000). 
Partisanship in Congress may be reinforced by the prevalence 
of divided government, in which one party controls at least one 
house of Congress and the other party controls the White House. 
Divided government creates incentives for Congress to use divi-
sive public policy debates on so-called "wedge issues" in order 
to damage the opposing party in future elections (Rose, 200 l ). 
Separation of powers, therefore, should be viewed as an impor-
tant influence on congressional roll call behavior (Fiorina, 1996). 
Our findings, however, suggest that the prevalence of divided 
government appears to have no affect on congressional LCV 
vote scores. The LCV vote scores for the l 03rd Congress and 
l08' h Congress (eras in which one party-the Democrats for the 
I 03rd and the Republicans for the I 08th --controlled both the 
White House and both chambers of Congress) do not vary sub-
stantially from the LCV vote scores of congresses with divided 
government. 
Besides partisanship, a constituency's political preferences as 
measured through its presidential vote, the per capita income of 
the constituency , and whether or not the constituency is in the 
Northeast or South are strongly related to a representative's LCV 
vote scores. The higher the constituency 's Democratic vote for 
president, the higher the representative 's LCV vote scores. Thus, 
legislators with constituents that supported the Democratic 
presidential candidate (i.e., Clinton in I 992 and 1996, Gore in 
2000) are more likely to support pro-environmental legislation . 
Similarly, the per capita income of a legislator's constituency is 
positively related to the legislator's support for pro-
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environmental policy; members of Congress from wealthier dis-
tricts tend to be more supportive of environmental legislation. 
Finally, in regards to region, representing a constituency from the 
Northeast region makes a legislator relatively more likely to 
support pro-environmental legislation while representing a con-
stituency from the South region makes a legislator relatively less 
likely to support pro-environmental legislation. 
The R-squares for all six models are quite high, but impor-
tantly there is a consistent upward trend for the R-squares from 
the 103rd Congress to 10th Congress . While the R-square for the 
103rd Congress is .655, the R-square for the 108th Congress is 
.835 . This implies that the variables tested have become even 
more important determinants of congressional LCV vote scores. 
Conclusion 
Using higher LCV scores to indicate a greater propensity to 
vote pro-environment, our results for the House of Representa-
tives correspond with Nelson 's (2002) findings in the Senate that 
the two most important predictors of a representative's environ-
mental voting pattern are party affiliation and region. In regards 
to partisanship, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to 
cast pro-environment votes. As for region, representatives from 
the West and Midwest represent the national average in terms of 
environmental voting patterns, while Northeastern representa-
tives are more likely to vote more pro-environment, and South-
ern representatives are less likely to vote pro-environment. We 
also find that periods of divided government do not play a role in 
environmental voting patterns in the House, which is consistent 
with Nelson 's (2002) findings for the U.S. Senate. Finally, our 
results show that the independent variables used in our analysis 
continue to become more consistent predictors of House envi-
ronmental voting patterns. 
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Our findings suggest some potentially interesting ideas for fu-
ture research. Environmental policy includes legislative issues 
ranging from energy use, to atmospheric deposition, to the pro-
tection of endangered plants and animals. In addition, environ-
mental policy regulates the actions of government, business, and 
private citizens. Nelson (2002) argues that the broader the set of 
environmental votes being analyzed, the larger the role of ideol-
ogy in voting patterns. Future research may benefit by focusing 
on more narrowly defined categories of environmental policy, as 
it may change the significance of particular constituency vari-
ables. For example, while region is found to be an important fac-
tor in explaining the variation in LCV scores for members of 
Congress, there is no clear explanation as to why this is the case. 
Focusing on more narrowly defined sub-categories of environ-
mental policy may shed light on some of the underlying reasons 
for strong regional effects. The same may be true for other con-
stituency factors as well, which may lead to important findings 
regarding the creation of environmental policy in a representa-
tive democracy. 
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